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Sierra Club v. DOT, 167 P.3d 292 (Haw. 2007).
Sarah Spigener, 3L, University of Mississippi School
of Law
The Supreme Court of Hawaii has concluded
that the Hawaii Department of Transportation
(DOT) must prepare an environmental assess-
ment (EA) for the Hawaii Superferry project.
Background
The Hawaii Superferry project is an inter-island
ferry service between the islands of O’ahu, Maui,
Kaua’i, and Hawai’i that utilizes harbor facilities
on each island. Hawaii Superferry, Inc. proposed
to develop and operate the service, which would
include two ferries capable of carrying up to 866
passengers and 282 cars per trip. The state and
Hawaii Superferry negotiated the details of the
project and DOT concluded that several im-
provements to Kahului Harbor were necessary to
accommodate the project. These improvements
included the construction of a removable barge
configured with a removable ramp, operational
support with utility services, security fencing,
pavement striping, the placement of boarding
gangway ramps, and installation of tents at
inspection points or customer waiting areas.
DOT prepared a draft EA, but did not refer-
ence the needed improvements. DOT later deter-
mined that the property “will have minimal or
no significant effect on the environment and is
therefore exempt from the preparation of an
EA.”1 The plaintiffs, environmental organiza-
tions Sierra Club, Maui Tomorrow, and the
Kahului Harbor Coalition, challenged DOT’s
determination that the improvements to the har-
bor were exempt from the requirements of the
Hawaii Environmental Protection Act (HEPA)
and the preparation of an EA. DOT and
Superferry filed a motion to dismiss or alterna-
tively for summary judgment. The circuit court
ruled that the plaintiffs lacked standing and
ruled in favor of DOT and Superferry. The plain-
tiffs appealed these holdings to the Supreme
Court of Hawaii.
Agency Analysis
HEPA requires that EAs and environmental
impact statements (EIS) be prepared for certain
development projects. The law also assures the
public the right to participate in planning pro-
jects that may affect the community. Compliance
with HEPA involves several steps. First, it must
be determined whether a project or program is
subject to the environmental review process. If
the project is exempt, then the process stagnates.
The Environmental Council determines the pro-
cedures for certain actions that will probably
have “minimal or no significant effects on the
environment” and that will be declared exempt
from the preparation of an assessment.2 When no
exemption applies and the project is subject to
environmental review, then a draft EA must be
prepared.
An EA is an informational document pre-
pared by the agency proposing the action to eval-
uate the possible environmental effects of a pro-
posed action. Once completed, the public has
thirty days to review and comment on the EA.
After this, the agency reviews the final EA to
determine if any “significant” environmental
Superferry, page 2
Hawaii DOT Must Prepare an 
EA for Superferry
Legal Reporter for the National Sea Grant College Program 
The
Volume 6:4, January, 2008
impacts are likely. If not, the agency issues a
finding of no significant impact (FONSI), which
allows the project to proceed. If so, the agency
must prepare a more detailed EIS. The public
process is repeated and the governor or mayor,
depending on the agency, must approve the final
EIS. After this, the action may be implemented.
HEPA provides for judicial review when no EA
is prepared, when an agency determines that an
EIS will or will not be required, and when an EIS
is accepted.
The court must determine whether the
agency’s factual determinations were clearly
erroneous and whether it otherwise complied
with HEPA and its implementing regulations, as
a matter of law. Likewise, exemption determina-
tions should be reviewed as a matter of law.
The organizations contended that they had
standing in this case based on two grounds: tra-
ditional injury in fact and procedural standing.
The court found that the plaintiff could sue on
either basis. Standing is a determination of
whether the parties have the right to bring suit.
The court utilized a three-part standing test: 1)
has the plaintiff suffered an actual or threatened
injury; 2) is the injury fairly traceable to the
defendant’s actions; and 3) would a favorable
decision likely provide relief for plaintiff ’s
injury. The test has been relaxed for environ-
mental cases. The plaintiff must prove 1) injury
in fact; 2) economic harm including aesthetic
and environmental well-being as interests de-
serving of protection; and 3) an individual’s
injury is not much different from that of a pub-
lic injury. The “procedural standing doctrine is a
means of accommodating the standing inquiry to
special circumstances created by injuries to
statutory procedural rights.”3
The court concluded that there is procedural
standing for members of the public under HEPA
because it is a procedural statute that accords
procedural rights. The court held that the threat-
ened injury in fact was due to DOT’s decision to
bypass conducting an EA and that the procedur-
al injury was due to violations of their procedur-
al rights under HEPA. The appellants also
demonstrated that the injuries were caused by
Superferry, from page 1
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DOT and Superferry and that they may be
addressed by the court.
DOT and Superferry also contested whether
the organizations had standing to bring a claim
against them on behalf of individual members.
The court stated that an organization may sue on
behalf of its members when 1) its members
would otherwise have standing to sue on their
own; 2) the interests it seeks to protect are ger-
mane to the organization’s purpose; and 3) nei-
ther the claim asserted nor the relief requested
requires the participation
of individual members in
the lawsuit. The parties
contested the last require-
ment. Normally, individ-
ual participation is required
where the plaintiffs re-
quest money damages or
where there are conflicts
of interests between mem-
bers. Since neither of those
situations applies in this
case, the court concluded
that the organizations had
standing to file suit on
behalf of its members.
Having established standing, the appel-
lants argued that DOT’s exemption determina-
tions were in violation of the law for several rea-
sons. The court characterized the issue as
“whether DOT was correct to analyze only the
harbor improvements in making its exemption
determination, or was also required to consider
the potential environmental impacts caused by
the Hawaii Superferry project.”4 The court stated
that an agency must first determine whether the
project meets the definition of exempt action
which is a minor project that will probably have
minimal or no significant effects on the environ-
ment. The court concluded that the Superferry
project was not such an action because DOT’s
exemption determination did not consider the
secondary impacts that could result from the use
of the Superferry on the Kahului Harbor or
whether the Superferry operations would have
any significant effects on the environment. As a
result, the court concluded that DOT’s determi-
nation that the improvements to Kahului Harbor
were exempt from the requirements of HEPA
were erroneous as a matter of law. The court
vacated the circuit court’s judgment, entered a
summary judgment on behalf of the appellants,
ordered DOT to conduct an EA before the project
could proceed, and remanded on other issues.
Conclusion
The court held that the appellant organizations
had standing to sue based on traditional standing
and procedural stand-
ing tests. The court also
held that the appellants
had organizational stand-
ing to sue on behalf of
their individual mem-
bers. The court agreed
with the appellants that
DOT had erroneously
declared the Hawaii
Superferry project an
exempt action thereby
exempting it  from
HEPA requirements.
The court entered judg-
ment on behalf of the
appellants and ordered DOT to conduct an EA
on the entire Superferry project before it could
continue operating and the necessary improve-
ments could be made.
Since the Supreme Court of Hawaii entered
this judgment in favor of the appellants, the
Hawaii legislature has approved a bill allowing
the Hawaii Superferry to resume operation. The
new legislation, supported by Governor Linda
Lingle, allows the ferry to make its Oahu-to-
Maui and Oahu-to-Kauai voyages while the envi-
ronmental assessment is being conducted.5
Endnotes
1.  Sierra Club v. DOT, 167 P.3d 292, 310 (Haw.
2007). 
2.  Id. at 300.
3.  Id. at 318. 
4.  Id. at 329.
5.  Christopher Pala, Legislature Clears Way for
Hawaii Ferry, N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 2007.
Photograph of Hawaii courtesy of ©Nova Development Corp.
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Natural Resources Defense Council v. Winter, 2007
WL 3377229 (9th Cir. Nov. 13, 2007).
Alicia Schaffer, 2L, Roger Williams University
School of Law
The views expressed herein are those of the author
and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Sea
Grant Law Center, NOAA, or any of its sub agencies. 
Since the 1960s, marine mammal stranding
events have been documented. There has been
evidence that these events have been linked to
underwater sonar testing. The first major strand-
ing event to be recorded was in the Bahamas in
March 2000. This event coincided with the
Navy’s use of mid-frequency sonar in the area at
the time.1 Even more recently, thirty-seven
whales were stranded off the coast of North
Carolina where Naval use of sonar was identified
as the probable cause.2
The National Resources Defense Council
(NRDC), bolstered by its success in a previous
suit against the Navy’s use of low-frequency
sonar, recently filed suit against the Navy once
again for its use of mid-frequency sonar.3 The
ensuing battle between the Navy and the NRDC
is based on the Navy’s plan to use mid-frequency
sonar in fourteen large-scale training exercises
off the coast of Southern California between
February 2007 and January 2009.4 The Navy’s
Environmental Assessment states that the exer-
cises will result in an estimated 170,000 “takes,”
which can include the harassment, harm, and
killing of these creatures.5
In this case, the NRDC filed for an injunc-
tion to prohibit the Navy’s use of sonar. In
August 2007, the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California granted an injunc-
tion; however, less than a month later, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed this decision
and stayed the injunction. In November 2007,
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, upon hear-
ing the case, reinstated the blanket injunction on
sonar testing until the Navy adheres to the miti-
gating factors prescribed by the district court. As
a result, marine mammals have been spared from
the full exposure of the Navy’s sonar use.
Background
Navy sonar, though not the only cause of noise
pollution in the water, is a major one. Mid-fre-
quency sonar is emitted into the water column at
a pressure of 235+ decibels for about 0.5 – 2 sec-
onds repeated every 28 seconds.6 The Navy’s
Environmental Assessment defines its use of
Court Grants Stay of Injunction
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mid-frequency sonar as “Level B” harassment
which means that the marine mammals will be
“subjected to sound levels of between 170 and
195 decibels.”7 However, the intensity of Level B
harassment is difficult to predict given the only
comparative test at levels of 235 decibels and
greater. The Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) requires hearing protec-
tion to be used where workers are exposed to
sounds at “90dB for eight hours or 110dB for as
little as thirty minutes.”8 Given that the sound of
a rocket taking off is 235 decibels, it is not unrea-
sonable to assume that the use of mid-frequency
sonar is potentially disruptive to marine mam-
mals’ health and way of life.9
Scientists have been looking for a definite
link between strandings and sonar. One group of
scientists, for example, cited a correlation
between low-frequency sonar testing and one
major stranding event.10 These mass-stranding
events are just one of the many alleged effects
that sonar has had on marine mammals, others
include: embolisms, gross damage to the audito-
ry system, hearing loss, interruption in feeding,
breeding and nursing, displacement from habi-
tat, and degradation of habitat.11 Prior to the
NRDC litigation, the Navy had been employing
mitigation measures to prevent such effects;
however, it recently eliminated many of these
practices. The district court references the aban-
donment of such measures as “power-downs” in
conditions where sound travels greater distances,
within the “twelve nautical mile coastal buffer
zone,” and “protection measures” during check-
point exercises.12
The Ninth Circuit’s Decisions
In August 2007, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals took a look at the balance of harms
between the two parties when deciding whether
to sustain the lower court’s injunction in favor of
the NRDC. The court concluded that the district
court did not properly balance the harms because
it failed to give proper consideration to the pub-
lic interest.13 The Ninth Circuit suggested that
national defense could be a higher priority than
the safety of whales. Specifically, the court stated
“[t]he public does indeed have a very considerable
interest in preserving our natural environment
and especially relatively scarce whales. But it also
has an interest in national defense…The safety of
the whales must be weighed, and so much the
safety of our warriors. And of our country.”14
Furthermore, the court stated that this is an
issue where deference should be given, because it
is a matter of national security.15 The majority
sided with the Navy based on the premise that
there is no other feasible place that this testing
could be done, because there is nothing on the
record that would suggest a feasible alternative at
this time.16 However, both the majority and the
dissent urged the expedient resolution to this
case in order to “eliminate a great deal of risk to
both our country and to marine wildlife.”17 This
goal of eliminating risk to national security and
wildlife was evident when the Ninth Circuit
handed down its decision on November 13, 2007.
The decision enjoins the Navy from continuing
with its training exercises unless it adheres to the
mitigation measures ordered by the district
court. However, if the district court fails to order
these measures the stay of the injunction can
become effective once again.18
Conclusion
The issue can be reduced simply: national secu-
rity versus the environment. The U.S. Navy touts
its commitment to “maintaining the balance
between defending freedom and remaining good
stewards of the environment” but is resistant to
implementing measures that would significantly
mitigate the harm caused by its actions.19 The
courts are tacitly allowing the Navy to fulfill its
role as both steward and defender. The Navy has
spent millions of dollars in research on this issue
and can point to measures taken to help the ani-
mals; hopefully, this, in addition to the court-
imposed mitigation measures, means that
marine mammals will not suffer the conse-
quences when testing resumes.
Looking to the future, there is a prospect of
more litigation if the Navy does not use mitiga-
tion measures. The Navy has set its sights on a
testing ground near the coast of North Carolina,
already the site of a stranding event of thirty-
seven whales linked to Naval activity. Suspicion
See Sonar, page 6
arose because of the proximity of the stranding,
both spatially and temporally, to the naval test-
ing and the absence of other factors that could
have caused it.20 Hopefully the Navy will learn
from the past two lawsuits and implement miti-
gation measures that are applicable to this area
from the start instead of burdening the courts
with yet another suit.
Update
On remand, the United States District Court for
the Central District of California issued an order
limiting the Navy’s sonar training exercises off
the coast of Southern California. The order limits
the use of medium-range sonar to an area beyond
12 nautical miles from shore and requires moni-
toring to detect the presence of marine mammals
before and during the exercises.
Endnotes
1.   Jasny, Michael, et al. Sounding the Depths II:
The Rising Toll of Sonar, Shipping and
Industrial Ocean Noise on Marine Life.
Natural Resources Defense Council. Nov.
2005. http://www.nrdc.org/wildlife/ marine/
sound/ sound.pdf . pg. 8-9.
2.  NRDC Press Release: Government Report on
Mass Whale Stranding in N.C. Identifies
Naval Sonar as Possible Cause. March 29,
2006. http://www.nrdc.org/media/press-
releases/060329a.asp .
3.   NRDC: Protecting Whales from Dangerous
Sonar.
www.nrdc.org/wildlife/marine/sonar.asp . 
4.   Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.
Winter. Unreported in F.Supp.2d, at 1. 2007
WL 2481037 (C.D.Cal., August 7, 2007).
5.   Id.
6.   Jasny, supra note 1, pg. 3.
7.   NRDC, 2007 WL 2481037 at *1.
8.   Id.
9.   Ocean Noise Affects Marine Life, ENVIRON-
MENT, 44 (5):4 (2002).
10. A. Frantzis, Does Acoustic Testing Strand
Whales? NATURE, 392, (6671):29 (1998).
11. Jasny, supra note 1, pg. 7.
12. NRDC, 2007 WL 2481037. 
13. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Winter.
502 F.3d 859, 863 (9th Cir. Aug. 31, 2007).
14. Id. at 863-864.
15. Id. at 862.
16. Id. at 864.
17. Id. at 865.
18. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Winter.  2007
WL 3377229 at *4-5 (9th Cir. Nov. 13, 2007).
19. U.S. Navy Website: Whales and Sonar.
http://www.whalesandsonar.navy.mil/index.htm . 
20. NRDC Press Release, supra note 2.
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United States v. Robison, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS
24825 (11th Cir. Oct. 24, 2007).
Terra Bowling, J.D. 
The Eleventh Circuit vacated a district court’s
conviction of a company and several members of
management for conspiracy to violate and viola-
tions of the Clean Water Act (CWA). The court
held that in light of the Supreme Court’s recent
decision in Rapanos the district court’s jury
instructions on “navigable waters” was inaccu-
rate and erroneous.
Background
McWane is a manufacturer of cast iron pipe,
flanges, valves, and fire hydrants. At its plant in
Birmingham, Alabama, the company discharges
wastewater into Avondale Creek. The CWA gen-
erally prohi-
bits the dis-
charge of pol-
lutants into
n a v i g a b l e
waters. How-
ever, the CWA
a u t h o r i z e s
either the EPA
or states ap-
proved by the
EPA to issue
permits for
the discharge
of pollutants
pursuant to a National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES).
McWane had an NPDES permit issued by the
Alabama Department of Environmental Man-
agement (ADEM) that allowed the company to
discharge some treated wastewater from one dis-
charge point at the plant, as long as it met certain
requirements. However, evidence showed that
the company discharged wastewater into the
creek from several unauthorized discharge
points. The permit also allowed the discharge of
stormwater runoff from specified stormwater
discharge points. Polluted wastewater was
spilling into stormwater run off points and flow-
ing into Avondale Creek.
The company and several of the company’s
employees were indicted, including several
managers - James Delk, Michael Devine, and
Charles Robison - and Donald Bills, the plant
engineer. At trial, several McWane employees
offered evidence of the violations. The district
court dismissed Bills from the case, and the
rest were convicted of various offenses.
McWane, Delk, and Devine appealed their
convictions. 
Navigable Waters
On appeal, McWane, Delk, and Devine (appel-
lants) argued that Avondale Creek did not meet
the definition of “navigable waterway” under the
CWA and, therefore, they did not violate the
CWA. The Eleventh Circuit noted that the
Supreme Court had interpreted the term “navi-
gable waters” in Rapanos while this appeal was
pending; therefore, the court looked at whether
the district court used the correct definition of
navigable waterways.
The Rapanos decision, a plurality decision,
did not provide a clear test for lower courts to use
when determining whether a body of water is a
“navigable waterway.” Justice Scalia’s opinion
would require navigable waters to be “relatively
permanent, standing or flowing bodies of water,”
and have a “continuous surface connection.”1
Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion would
require a “significant nexus” between a water or
wetland and another water that is or was naviga-
ble in fact or could reasonably be made so. The
circuit courts are split over which opinion to use.
The Seventh and Ninth Circuits have used
Kennedy’s opinion, while the First Circuit has
said that either test may be used.
See Nexus, page 8
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In this instance, the appellants argued that
Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test should be
used, while the government argued that either
test could apply. The Eleventh Circuit looked
at the reasoning used by the circuit courts in
reaching their conclusion. Citing U.S. v. Gerke,
a Seventh Circuit case heard after the Rapanos
decision, the Eleventh Circuit noted that
“when a majority of the Supreme Court agrees
only on the result of a case, lower courts ‘are to
follow the narrowest ground to which a major-
ity of the Justices would have assented if forced
to choose.’”2 The Gerke court believed that
Justice Kennedy’s test would be the narrowest
ground. Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit con-
cluded that Kennedy’s significant nexus test
should be the governing definition of naviga-
ble waterway. 
Jury Instruction
In the district court, the jury did not mention the
phrase “significant nexus” in its “navigable
waters” instruction to the jury or instruct the
jury to consider the chemical, physical, or bio-
logical effect of Avondale Creek on the Black
Warrior River. The court held that because the
instruction did not include Justice Kennedy’s
“significant nexus” test, it was erroneous. The
court therefore vacated the district court’s judg-
ment, reversed the convictions, and remanded
the case.
Endnotes
1. Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208 at
2242-44 (U.S. 2006).
2. United States v. Robison, 2007 U.S. App.
LEXIS 24825 (11th Cir. Oct. 24, 2007).
Litigation Update
In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consolidated Liti-
gation, 495 F.3d 191 (5th Cir. 2007).
Sarah Spigener, 3L, University of Mississippi School
of Law
On August 29th, 2005, before Hurricane Katrina
reached New Orleans, the levees of the 17th Street
Canal failed and caused water to inundate the area.
Several homeowners sued their insurance compa-
nies seeking compensation for the loss of their
property. The insurance companies objected and
claimed that the damage was excluded from their
policies. The Eastern District Court of Louisiana
ruled in favor of the homeowners and concluded
that without a specific definition included in an
exclusion in the policy, the term “flood” in many of
the policies was ambiguous. The court contem-
plated common dictionary definitions to deter-
mine that the term “flood” in some of the insur-
ance policies referred to natural events and a “ris-
ing over,” an “overflowing,” or an “overtopping” of
water. The court concluded that the insurance
policies containing an ambiguous definition of
“flood” were therefore required to compensate the
homeowners according to their policies.
The Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals, however, disagreed with the court’s
decision. On appeal, the court concluded that
even if the plaintiffs could prove that the con-
struction or maintenance of the levees caused the
damage to their property, the flood exclusions in
the homeowners’ policies unambiguously pre-
cluded their recovery. The court held that the
term “flood” included in the insurance policies
was unambiguous. The court also looked to dic-
tionaries to determine that a “flood” is defined as
an “inundation of land.” The court also consid-
ered other court interpretations of similar insur-
ance coverage as it related to the failure of struc-
tures such as dams or dikes. In these cases, the
courts uniformly held that the inundation of
water falls within the policy exclusions.
Additionally, the court noted that the levee is a
flood-control structure, designed to prevent
floods, which is what happened in this case. The
court also disagreed that a “flood” is limited to
natural events. The court vacated the judgment
of the district court and entered judgment in
favor of the defendant insurance policies.
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Pasternak v. State of Alaska, Commercial Fisheries
Entry Commission, 2007 Alas. Lexis 107 (Alaska
Sept. 7, 2007).
Sara Wilkinson, 3L, University of Mississippi School
of Law
The Alaska Supreme Court has upheld the
decision of the Alaska Commercial Fisheries
Entry Commission (CFEC) regarding partici-
pation in non-distressed fisheries. The
Supreme Court specifically addressed a 1985
CFEC decision that limited Alaska’s Northern
Southeast Inside sablefish longline fishery to
seventy-three permits. 
Background
The CFEC, under the authority of Alaska’s
Limited Entry Act, is charged with determining
both the optimum and the maximum number of
permits for a fishery and outlining the qualifica-
tions for the issuance of permits. The CFEC dis-
tributes permits based on a point system used to
determine an applicant’s order of priority, taking
into account past participation as a skipper or
crew member in the particular fishery, as well as
economic dependence on the fishery. Points for
permit priority may also be awarded based on
income dependence and vessel investment. 
In 1985, the CFEC limited participation in
the Northern Southeast Inside sablefish longline
fishery over concern for the economic and envi-
ronmental health of the fishery. The commission
limited the fishery to seventy-three permits to be
distributed on a points-based application system.
In determining the number of permits, the
CFEC was required to set a maximum number of
permits “no lower than the highest number of
units of gear in the fishery in the four years prior
to the January 1, 1985 qualification date.”1 Since
the fishery had seventy-three units of gear in one
of those years, the maximum number could be no
lower than seventy-three. Because the fishery was
considered non-distressed, the CFEC had the
authority to set the optimum number of available
permits at a number higher than seventy-three.2
After the issuance of a public notice, seventy-
three became the optimum and the maximum
number of permits available in May 2001. 
In November 1987, Walter Pasternak submit-
ted an application for a limited entry permit,
claiming fifty-one points based on past partici-
pation in the fishery, vessel ownership, and
income dependence. In April 1989, the CFEC
awarded Pasternak forty-three and one-half
points, reducing the vessel ownership points
because Pasternak’s wife jointly owned the ves-
sel. Pasternak requested a hearing regarding the
points distributed for vessel ownership and in
March 1991 was issued a written decision award-
ing all fifteen vessel ownership points bringing
his point total to fifty-one points. 
In January 2003, the CFEC denied
Pasternak’s application because fifty-one points
were insufficient to qualify him for a fishery per-
mit. In February 2003, Pasternak filed petition
for reconsideration with the CFEC and, shortly
thereafter, an appeal in superior court alleging
that the CFEC set the maximum number of per-
mits available for the fishery too low. Pasternak’s
case was stayed pending the court’s decision in a
similar case, Simpson v. State, Commercial
Fisheries Entry Commission. 
Maximum Number of Permits
The court noted that in its review of an agency’s
interpretation of its own regulation, a reasonable
basis standard of review was appropriate. In
essence, the Alaska Supreme court will defer to
the agency’s expertise and decision unless its
“interpretation is plainly erroneous and incon-
sistent with the regulation.”3
Pasternak claimed that the CFEC erred in
setting the maximum number of permits at sev-
enty-three and sought a ten-permit increase. In
discussing Pasternak’s claim, the court looked
See Fishery Decision, page 10
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primarily at Simpson, in which
the plaintiff challenged both
the maximum and optimum
number of permits set for the
fishery by the CFEC. The court
rejected Simpson’s claim using
a two-pronged test. The test
first clarified that the maxi-
mum number of permits should
be set at a level that is no lower
than the highest number of
units of gear in operation in any
one year for the four years prior
to the limitation on the fishery.
Second, the CFEC must meet
its primary goals of conserving
the fishery while enabling fish-
ermen to receive adequate compensation. The
court held that the CFEC met both requirements
and found in favor of the CFEC’s allotment of
seventy-three permits for the fishery. 
Relying on Simpson, the court rejected
Pasternak’s argument that the maximum number
of permits should be increased for the fishery.
Pasternak also argued in the alternative that the
maximum number of permits should simply be
increased to seventy-four permits. However, the
court noted that there was no evidence to indicate
that if the maximum number was increased to sev-
enty-four Pasternak would be eligible for a permit. 
Optimum Number of Permits
In addition to challenging the maximum number
of permits, Pasternak challenged the CFEC’s
decision regarding the optimum number of per-
mits for the fishery. In Simpson, the court upheld
the CFEC’s decision to set the optimum number
of permits at seventy-three. Pasternak asserted
that positive changes in the fishery justified an
increase in the optimum number of permits set
at seventy-three. The court rejected Pasternak’s
argument based on the holding in Simpson and
evidence that the fishery was actually declining.
Permitting Points Based on Past Participation
Pasternak’s final argument asserted that the
CFEC erred by refusing to consider his claim for
participation in 1983. Past participation points
are awarded based on a harvest
of at least 2,000 pounds or a
proof of some extraordinary
circumstance that prevented
participation in the year in
question. Pasternak did not par-
ticipate in the fishery in 1983,
rendering him ineligible for
participation points absent the
showing of extraordinary cir-
cumstances that prevented his
participation.
Pasternak explained that he
did not participate in the fishery
in 1983 due to concerns over his
equipment and the advice of
other fishermen. The court
found that Pasternak’s explanation did not fall
within the scope of extraordinary circumstances
because he did not make all reasonably possible
efforts to participate in the fishery in 1983.
Conclusion
The Alaska Supreme Court upheld the CFEC’s
decision regarding the maximum and optimum
number of permits for Alaska’s Northern
Southeast Inside sablefish longline fishery. In
addition, the court held that Pasternak was not
entitled to participation points for extraordi-
nary circumstances for 1983. In essence, the
court primarily relied on its past holding in
Simpson, which upheld the CFEC’s decision for
the same fishery.
Endnotes
1.  Simpson v. State, Commercial Fisheries Entry
Comm’n, 101 P.3d 605, 607 (Alaska 2004).
2.  The Alaska Supreme Court differentiated
between distressed and non-distressed fish-
eries in Johns v. Commercial Fisheries Entry
Commission, 758 P.2d 1256, 1262 n.6 (Alaska
1988). The court noted “a non-distressed fish-
ery may tolerate more units of gear than the
historic high. In contrast, a distressed fishery,
by definition, cannot…Second, a distressed
fishery is one which is overgeared as of
January 1, 1973.”
3.  Simpson, 101 P.3d 605.
Photograph of sablefish being measured courtesy
of NOAA.
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NPDES Permit May Allow
Photography of Premises
Bowman Apple Products Co., Inc. v. State Water
Control Board, 2007 Va. App. LEXIS 345 (Sept.
18, 2007).
Margaret Enfinger, 2L, University of Alabama
School of Law
The Virginia Court of Appeals has found that
companies requesting permits to discharge into
state waters may have to allow inspectors to pho-
tograph their premises. 
Background
Bowman Apple Products uses well water in bot-
tling its products in Virginia. The company is
required to have a Virginia Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (VDPES) permit issued by
the State Water Control Board to discharge
wastewater into a nearby river. The permit con-
tains an “inspection and entry provision”
that allows an agent of the Virginia
Department of Environmental
Quality (VDEQ) to enter the proper-
ty to ensure compliance with the
permit. During an inspection,
Bowman officials refused to let a
VDEQ agent take photographs. 
When the time arrived for a new
permit, the State Water Control Board
added another requirement to the com-
pany’s permit: Bowman must allow photogra-
phy during inspections. Bowman objected to
this new rule and sued under the Virginia
Administrative Process Act, claiming that the
agency’s implementation of the new requirement
was “arbitrary and capricious.” Specifically, the
company objected to the overbroad nature of the
new requirement, which would result in an auto-
matic violation of the permit if the company had
any restrictions on photography, even restrictions
to protect the company’s proprietary interest. In
its complaint, the company also alleged that the
VDEQ did not follow the proper administrative
procedures in instituting the requirement and
noted that the rule was not included on any other
permit in the state.
The circuit court held that the new require-
ment was reasonable, although the language of
the provision could result in different interpreta-
tions. The court remanded the case to the agency,
directing it to amend the permit’s special
requirement to only allow photography that was
reasonably related to the investigation. 
Virginia Disagrees
On appeal, relying upon the EPA’s inspection
manual, the Virginia Court of Appeals reasoned
that photos are a reasonable part of a thorough
and accurate inspection report. They document
conditions and are evidence in enforcement pro-
ceedings. In fact, they are similar to the already
established permit requirement of allowing
access to and copying of records.
While this permit requirement of
allowing photography is unique in
Bowman’s permit, this does not auto-
matically mean that it is impermis-
sible. In fact, this special require-
ment became necessary for the
inspections because of Bowman’s con-
tinued refusal to permit photography.
Also, Bowman did not give up all pri-
vacy as the company could restrict pho-
tography that was not related to the investiga-
tion. The court of appeals subsequently upheld
the circuit court’s amended permit requirement.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court of Virginia has held that the
control of discharges into Virginia’s waters is
necessary for the common good. The court of
appeals seemed to think that photography is a
reasonable way for an agency to control and
enforce its discharge permits. In other words,
photography may be a necessary part of the
inspection process.
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Skowronek v. American Steamship Company, 2007
U.S. App. LEXIS 23926 (Oct. 12, 2007). 
Terra Bowling, J.D.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has found
that an injured seaman is bound by maintenance
rates in the collective bargaining agreement
(CBA) governing his employment. 
Background 
A maintenance fee is paid by ship owners to cover
the cost of food and lodging of ill or injured seamen
while they are unable to work. In September 2004,
Larry Skowronek was working aboard an American
Steamship Company vessel when he suffered a
heart attack. Skowronek remained out of service for
almost two months while he was recuperating. The
company paid Skowronek $56.00 per week as a
maintenance fee, in accordance with the CBA
between his union and his employer.
Skowronek filed suit, arguing that instead of
the $56.00 rate for ill crew members he should be
awarded the CBA’s $300 per-week rate for injured
crew members. The United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan granted
Skowronek summary judgment. 
Fair Deal
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit examined whether
the maintenance rate for ill crew members was
enforceable under the CBA, in light of the
injured crew member rate of $300 per week. The
court acknowledged that federal courts generally
enforce negotiated maintenance rates in a CBA,
even if the rates do not cover a crew member’s
daily food and lodging expenses.
In a previous case regarding negotiated main-
tenance rates, the Sixth Circuit held “when a
benefits package includes an express reference to
a precise rate of maintenance, it must be pre-
sumed that this rate was arrived at by negotia-
tion.”1 The court concluded that these negotiated
rates are the “result of give and take collective
bargaining between parties” and should be bind-
ing.2 Therefore, the court presumed that the rates
in Skowronek’s CBA were negotiated and bind-
ing and did not speculate whether $8.00 per day
was sufficient to provide Skowronek with food
and lodging.
The court held that when a maintenance rate
is negotiated, the plaintiff has the burden of
proving that the rates were not legitimately nego-
tiated, that the agreement was unfair as a whole,
or that the union did not adequately represent
him. Skowronek did not present evidence to
prove any of these issues.
Conclusion 
The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s
decision. The court found that the maintenance
rates were the result of the collective bargaining
between the parties and, therefore, should be
binding. The court also held that the plaintiff has
the burden of proving that the rates were not
legitimately negotiated, that the agreement was
unfair as a whole, or that the union did not ade-
quately represent him.
One judge dissented, finding “the collective
bargaining agreement presently before the court
contains an unusual provision that discriminates
between ill and injured seamen. This provision is
inconsistent with the common law of admiralty,
and at odds with the reasons why courts original-
ly developed and protected seaman’s right to
maintenance.”3
Endnotes
1. Al-Zawkari v. American S.S. Co., 871 F.2d 585,
588 (6th Cir. 1989).
2.  Skowronek v. American Steamship Company,
2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 23926 at *9-10 (Oct.
12, 2007). 
3. Id. at *20.
Seaman Bound by
Employment Contract
Crawford v. Elec. Boat Corp., 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 74385 (D. Conn. 2007).
Amber Myers Robinson, 3L, University of Mississippi
School of Law
In an admiralty suit filed by a seaman who
claimed to have contracted a staph infection
while working aboard a ship, the United States
District Court for the District of Connecticut
granted motions to dismiss in favor of defen-
dants, the United States and Electric Boat. The
court granted defendant United States’ Rule
12(b)(1) motion to dismiss the Federal Torts
Claim Act (FTCA) claim for lack of subject mat-
ter jurisdiction and the United States’ and
Electric Boat’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss
an unseaworthiness claim, for failure to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted. 
Background
Bruce Crawford, an engineer for Electric Boat,
was assigned to take the vessel SSN-023 on a
final sea trial before it was released as a Navy
Ship. Crawford alleged that while on the voyage,
he contracted a serious infection known as
Methylin Resistant Staph Aureus, due to
the vessel’s unsanitary condition. The in-
fection eventually spread to
Crawford’s family causing open
sores, disfiguring wounds, and
pain. The Crawford family
incurred the cost of medical
care and disinfecting proce-
dures to rid them of the infec-
tion. Crawford and his family,
including his wife and two
minor children, filed suit.
The plaintiffs filed suit for
negligence and unseaworthi-
ness under the Federal Torts
Claim Act (FTCA), Suits in
Admiralty Act (SAA), Public
Vessels Act (PVA), the Jones Act, the Longshore
and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act
(LHWCA), and general maritime law. The plain-
tiffs also brought suit against both Electric Boats
and the United States, claiming that the United
States was already in control of the vessel; how-
ever, the court did not visit this question. 
Motion to dismiss FTC claim 
The United States moved to dismiss the FTCA
claim under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject mat-
ter jurisdiction. The United States claimed that
the FTCA claim should be dismissed, since the
SAA alone gives the court jurisdiction. Also, the
language of the FTCA provides that the act does
not apply to “any claim for which a remedy is pro-
vided by chapter 309 [the Suits in Admiralty Act]
or 311 [the Public Vessels Act] of title 46 relating
to claims or suits in admiralty against the United
States.”1 The plaintiffs argued that the FTCA
claim should not be dismissed since it was only
pled in the alternative; however, the court dis-
agreed, holding that if the plaintiffs’ suit was in
admiralty it could only be brought under an
admiralty statute and not the FTCA. As a result
of this holding, the court looked at the facts of the
case to determine if this was a suit that could be
brought under an admiralty statute. 
The court applied the
“situs/status” test laid out in
Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes
Dredge & Dock Co.2 to determine
whether there was admiralty
jurisdiction. The “situs/status”
test requires (1) that the tort
took place on navigable waters
or was caused by a vessel on
navigable waters and (2) that
the tort had a significant rela-
tionship to traditional mar-
itime activity. The court quick-
ly determined that Crawford’s
satisfied the “situs” portion of
Court Dismisses Seaman’s
MRSA Claim
See Admiralty, page 14
Scanning electron microscopy of Staphylococcus
courtesy of NIH.
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the test, since he was injured while he was aboard
a vessel that was at sea. However, the court had to
conduct a different analysis to determine if the
injuries to the other three plaintiffs fell within
admiralty jurisdiction. 
Under the Extension of Admiralty Juris-
diction Act, “the admiralty and maritime juris-
diction of the United States extends to and
includes cases of injury or damage, to person or
property, caused by a vessel on navigable waters,
even though the injury or damage is done or con-
summated on land.”3 Therefore, if the other three
plaintiffs’ injuries were caused by a vessel on
navigable waters then their injuries would fall
under admiralty jurisdiction, regardless of the
fact that they came into contact with the infec-
tion on land. 
The defendants argued that because the ves-
sel was conducting a sea trial, it was not “in nav-
igation.” The court, following the Stewart v.
Dutra4 analysis, determined that there is no sepa-
rate “in navigation” requirement. All that is
required is that the vessel is used or is capable of
being used as maritime transportation. The court
noted that not only was the vessel capable of
being used for maritime transportation, that it
was actually being used as maritime transporta-
tion. Therefore, the court held that the other
three plaintiffs also satisfied the “situs” portion
of the test for admiralty tort jurisdiction. 
Finally, the court applied the second portion
of the admiralty tort jurisdiction test, the “sta-
tus” test. Under the “status” test there are two
issues: (1) the court looks at the incident and
determines whether it has a potential to disrupt
maritime commerce; and, (2) the court deter-
mines whether the nature of the activity giving
rise to the incident has a substantial relation-
ship to traditional maritime activity. The court
found that all plaintiffs met the “status” ele-
ment of the test. The court, using persuasive
case authority, determined that unsafe condi-
tions occurring on a vessel under repair has a
potential to disrupt maritime commerce. The
court also determined that a naval sea operation
was considered traditional maritime activity,
therefore satisfying the second element of the
“status” test. 
Motion to dismiss for failure to state an unsea-
worthiness claim
The defendants, United States and Electric Boat,
argued that the plaintiffs failed to establish a
claim under maritime law for unseaworthiness.
The defendants argued that Crawford was not
given a warranty of seaworthiness since he was on
the voyage in order to test the vessel for seawor-
thiness. The defendants relied on two Fifth
Circuit cases5 that had established that there was
no warranty of seaworthiness for a vessel under-
going a sea trial. The plaintiffs argued that those
cases had been overruled by Stewart. However,
the court disagreed with the plaintiffs and found
that Stewart only overruled the “vessel in naviga-
tion” issue. The court held that a warranty of sea-
worthiness could not exist before the vessel had
completed the sea trial test that was being admin-
istered in order to make the vessel seaworthy. 
Conclusion
The United States District Court for the District
of Connecticut granted the United States’ motion
to dismiss the FTCA claim, holding that the SAA
and PAV were mutually exclusive from the
FTCA and since the plaintiffs had an admiralty
cause of action that they would have to file suit
under an admiralty statute. The court also grant-
ed the defendants’ motion to dismiss for failing
to state a claim for unseaworthiness, holding that
a vessel cannot have a warranty of seaworthiness
before the sea trial granting its seaworthiness is
complete.
Endnotes
1.  28 U.S.C. 2680(d).
2.  Grubert Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock
Co., 513 U.S. 527(1995). 
3.  46 U.S.C. 3010(a). 
4.  Stewart v. Dutra Constr. Co., 543 U.S. 481
(2005). 
5.  Reynolds v. Ingalls Shipbuilding Div., Litton
Sys., Inc., 788 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1986);
Williams v. Avondale shipyards, Inc., 452 F.2d
955 (5th Cir. 1971).
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Mellor v. Moe, 2007 WL 2883784 (S.D. Fla. Sept.
27, 2007).
Sarah Spigener, 3L, University of Mississippi School
of Law
The Southern District Court of Florida has held
that the operators of a 30-foot fishing boat and a
jet-ski were equally at fault for a collision that
fatally injured the driver of the jet-ski. The court
concluded that the Death on the High Seas Act
(DOSHA) applied to the collision since it
occurred in Bahamian waters and awarded dam-
ages to the victim’s parents.
Background
The Mellor family took a cruise from Florida to
the Bahamas in August 2003. On the day of the
accident, the family arrived on a beach from an
excursion ferry. While on the beach, Jason
Mellor, his brother John Mellor, and
Shannon Mitchell rented jet-skis.
With Shannon as a passenger on
Jason’s jet-ski, they departed the
beach. At that time, the
weather was turn-
ing darker and a
rain storm was
approaching.
Jason and Shannon
briefly stopped
to wipe their
glasses and
when Jason 
started driving
again, Shannon saw a boat traveling towards
them. John briefly saw the boat when it was
about 100 feet away and again about 2 to 3 sec-
onds before it collided with Jason’s jet-ski. The
driver of the boat testified that he did not see the
jet-skis until impact, but the passenger in the
boat testified he saw the jet-ski a “split-second”
before impact. Jason Mellor was fatally injured
in the collision. His parents brought an action
against the driver of the boat pursuant to
DOSHA to recover damages.
DOSHA Claim
The plaintiffs, Jason’s parents, contended that
the court has jurisdiction pursuant to DOSHA
because the incident occurred on the high seas.
The defendant, the driver of the boat, argued
that the collision occurred in Bahamian waters,
not the high seas, and DOSHA should not apply.
DOSHA does not include a definition of “high
seas” so the court examined prior cases to deter-
mine its meaning. In a similar case, the court
held that a negligence action filed by the
estate of a cruise ship passenger who suf-
fered a heart attack while
snorkeling in
Mexican waters
was covered under
DOSHA.1 The court of
appeals, in yet another case, stated that
DOSHA applied when the cause of action arose
within the territorial waters of a foreign coun-
try.2 Finally, in a third case, the court of appeals
concluded that DOSHA applied to a death in
the Bahamas.3 Because the death occurred in
Bahamian waters, the court concluded that
DOSHA applied to this case.
DOSHA Applies to Jet-Ski
Accident in Bahamian Waters
See DOSHA, page 16
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In order for the court to apply DOSHA to this
case, the court must first have admiralty jurisdic-
tion. To determine admiralty jurisdiction, the
court must decide whether the cause of action
bears a significant relationship to traditional
maritime activity. The court, in the snorkeling
case mentioned above, concluded that “the sig-
nificant relationship test was met because the
decedent was a paying passenger aboard a cruise
ship sailing from Florida to Mexico which
arranged maritime recreational activities for its
passengers.”4 Because the only difference
between the two cases was that the cruise ship
was included as one of the defendants, the court
concluded that the significant relationship test
would also be satisfied in this case thereby giving
the court admiralty jurisdiction.
DOSHA allows the decedent’s parents to
seek a claim for compensation of the pecuniary
loss sustained as a result of the decedent’s death.
In order to apply DOSHA, the court must deter-
mine the comparative negligence of the defen-
dant and the decedent. The parties cited two dif-
ferent rules that they claimed should be the con-
trolling standard to determine comparative neg-
ligence. The court concluded that the jet-skis did
have the right of way, but according to the
International Regulations for Preventing
Collisions at Sea (COLREGS), should have
taken action to avoid the collision. The court
concluded that the boat and the jet-ski equally
caused the accident; therefore, the decedent’s
comparative negligence is 50 percent.
Next, the court must determine the amount
of damages the plaintiffs should receive.
DOSHA damages are “limited to fair com-
pensation for the pecuniary damages of the
parents of Jason Mellor.”5 The court deter-
mined that the services Jason performed,
such as mowing the lawn, shoveling snow,
walking the dogs, and driving his brother var-
ious places is compensable. The court deter-
mined that these services constituted six
hours of work per week at a rate of $18.50 an
hour. Also, the costs of the decedent’s funeral
and burial arrangements could be compen-
sated. The court awarded damages to the par-
ents for the 26.5 years of their life expectancy
plus the cost of the funeral and burial, reduced
by 50 percent for comparative negligence, for a
total of $83,877.08.
Conclusion
The court concluded that the drivers of the boat
and of the jet-ski were equally at fault for the
collision that occurred in Bahamian waters.
The court concluded that it had admiralty juris-
diction for an accident that occurred in foreign
territorial waters. The court determined that
the parents of the decedent were entitled to
compensation for the pecuniary loss of the
decedent’s services and for the funeral and bur-
ial arrangements, minus the amount of the
decedent’s comparative negligence.
Endnotes
1. Moyer v. Rederi, 645 F.Supp. 620 (S.D. Fla.
1986).
2. Sanchez v. Loffland Bros. Co., 626 F.2d 1228
(5th Cir. 1980). This case is binding on this
court because the court was part of the Fifth
Circuit until 1981.
3. Ford v. Wooten, 681 F.2d 712, 716 (11th Cir.
1982).
4. Mellor v. Moe, 2007 WL 2883784 at *4 (S.D.
Fla. Sept. 27, 2007); citing, Moyer, 645 F.Supp.
at 624-25.
5. Id. at *6.
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Oregon Natural Resources Council Fund v.
Goodman, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 22614 (9th Cir.
Sept. 24, 2007). 
Terra Bowling, J.D.
The Ninth Circuit has held that the United States
Forest Service (USFS) violated the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the
National Forest Management Act (NFMA) by not
properly evaluating a proposed expansion of a ski
resort within the Rogue River and Klamath
National Forest. The court also held that the
approval violated the NFMA by not designating
riparian reserves and restricted watershed terrain. 
Background
For two decades, the Mount Ashland Association
(MAA) has been exploring the possibility of
expanding the Mount Ashland Ski Area (MASA),
located near Ashland, Oregon. MAA, which leas-
es the area from the city, had planned to expand
MASA and upgrade its facilities, including the
creation of beginner and intermediate ski and
snowboard areas. 
NEPA requires government entities to look at
the environmental effects of major federal projects
affecting the environment. Agencies must prepare
an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) that
“provide full and fair discussion of significant envi-
ronmental impacts and … inform decisionmakers
and the public of the reasonable alternatives which
would avoid or minimize adverse impacts or
enhance the quality of the human environment.1
NFMA requires the USFS to develop “forest
plans” that maintain the fish and wildlife habitat
of area species. The MASA area is subject to two
forest plans, the Rogue River LRMP and the
NWFP. Under the Rogue River Plan, the USFS
must manage and maintain area species, espe-
cially sensitive species. The area is home to a sen-
sitive species, the Pacific fisher. The LRMP also
requires the agency to conduct an evaluation of
recreational lands projects.
After MAA submitted a plan to the USFS, the
agency prepared a draft Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS), which caused the public and
the Environmental Protection Agency to express
concerns about erosion and sedimentation and
the threat to biodiversity, watershed resources,
and water quality. The USFS then issued a Final
Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) analyz-
ing six expansion alternatives. A month later, the
NFWS issued a Record of Decision (ROD)
selecting one of the alternatives for the expan-
sion, with some modifications. The plan selected
by the Service proposed several new additions to
MASA: (1) the construction of two new chair lifts
and two new surface lifts; (2) clear cutting seven-
ty-one acres for new ski runs; and (3) the clearing
of four acres for lift corridors and staging areas.
The ROD generated 28 notices of appeal, but the
Service denied all of the appeals. 
Several environmental groups filed suit in
federal court seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief under NEPA and NFMA. The groups
claimed that the Forest Service failed to ensure
the viability of the fisher, as well as to adequate-
ly consider and disclose the direct and cumula-
tive impacts on the fisher. The groups also
claimed that the agency failed to (3) evaluate
whether the expansion will comply with wet-
lands laws; (4) adhere to Rogue River LRMP and
NWFP standards and guidelines for protecting
watersheds and riparian areas; (5) disclose the
error rate of the model used to estimate sediment
impacts on the municipal watershed; and (6)
adequately disclose cumulative water quality
impacts by utilizing a flawed computer model.
The United States District Court for the District
of Oregon granted summary judgment in favor of
USFS, but enjoined construction until the Ninth
Circuit ruled on a motion to stay. 
The Pacific Fisher
The Ninth Circuit considered whether the dis-
trict court erred in its decision. The court first
Ski Resort Plan Approval in
Violation of NEPA and NFMA
See Ski Resort, page 18
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looked at whether the USFS violated NFMA by
failing to evaluate the effects of the expansion on
the Pacific fisher, a sensitive species. The USFS
had prepared a biological evaluation on the
impact of a MASA expansion on the fisher in
1999; however, the Service did not update the
1999 biological evaluation to reflect the Pacific
fisher’s appearance in the project area two years
later. The Ninth Circuit found that the
Service’s habitat evaluation did not meet the
requirements of the LRMP’s evaluation require-
ment; therefore, the USFS violated NFMA. 
Next, the court considered whether the
Service violated NEPA. First, the court found
that the Service failed to analyze the incremental
impact of the actions, including all past, present,
and future projects. The court then noted that
the USFS failed to explain the effect of the pro-
ject on a biological corridor between the
Klamath-Siskiyou and Southern Cascades
Regions. Because of these failures, the Service
was also in violation of NEPA.
The Ninth Circuit also ruled that the USFS
violated NFMA by failing to designate riparian
reserves and restricted watersheds, as required
under the Rogue River LRMP and the NWFP.
The riparian reserves and restricted
watersheds are intended to provide
buffer zones in areas prone to mudslides
and other hydrologically important
areas. Because the Service failed to do
this, the court found that the terrain
within the expansion would not be ade-
quately protected. 
The court held that the district
court did not err in ruling in favor of
USFS on the remaining claims. The
court found that the USFS provided
adequate analysis in the FEIS regard-
ing these claims. Furthermore, the
court held that the claims regarding
the Pacific fisher were the only ones
warranting injunctive relief, given the
potential for irreparable environmen-
tal harm. 
Conclusion
Ninth Circuit re-
versed the district
court, holding that
USFS had violated
the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act
and the National
Forest Management
Act by not properly
evaluating the pro-
ject’s impact on the Pacific fisher. The court
found that the approval also violated the NFMA
by not designating riparian reserves and
restricted watershed terrain. The court granted
injunctive relief and remanded the case to the
district court.
Endnotes
1. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.
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By Will Wilkins
In the last article on copyright basics, we looked
at what was required to create a copyrighted
work, who owns that work, and what rights went
along with ownership. We will spend the next
several articles looking in a little more detail at
some of these issues.
Today, we will delve into an issue on which I
spend a great deal of time and energy. When a
copyrighted work is created, the owner of that
work inherits some very strong rights to control
the use of that work. However, unlike with own-
ership of other personal property (a car, for
instance), the general public is also given some
rights to use the copyrighted work even without
the consent of the owner of the copyright. Using
the car analogy, it would be like someone having
the right to drive your car every Tuesday morning
without asking. Some of these use rights include
the classroom teaching exception, fair use, and
library copying, each of which will be discussed
below.
First, however, let’s look at a way you can use
others’ works without having to rely on the statu-
tory exceptions. It is very simple: permission.
You can use another’s copyrighted work if you
have their permission to do so. Permissions in
the copyright world are generally termed “releas-
es” or “licenses.”
In asking for permission, you should consid-
er the exact parameters of the permission since
there are infinite variables, such as: the number
of times the material may be used, geographic
restrictions to the use, notice requests, and the
manner in which it may be used. As to the man-
ner in which the material may be used, you
could, for instance, limit the use to print or
expand it to include print and electronic media.
Another issue to consider in obtaining permis-
sion is documentation. It is very important to
document the permission so that both parties are
clear on the terms and scope of the permission,
and the preferred method is through the use of
written agreements such as licenses or releases.
The person requesting the permission will also
need to make sure that the person granting the
permission actually has the power to grant it so
that you are not (to continue the analogy) asking
my neighbor if you can borrow my car.
The law, however, does not require permis-
sion before using a copyrighted work at all times.
In fact, there are some fairly major exceptions to
the ownership rights. 
One that is not exactly an exception applies
to U.S. Government documents. Works prepared
by an employee of the U.S. Government as part
of his or her job are generally not copyrightable.
Exercise caution in dealing with Government
documents, however, because the work may actu-
ally be the work of someone other than a federal
employee or the work may contain within it
copyrighted works. Additionally, be aware that
the U.S. Government can hold trademarks (no
using the presidential seal). So, a little sleuthing
is necessary in using Government works. 
Another instance when permission is not
necessary is where the material is not protected
by copyright or is in the “public domain.” Works
may fall into the public domain in several ways.
First, the author may place them there expressly
by stating that the work is in the public domain
and may be freely used. Second, a copyright may
expire and the work is placed in the public
domain. The current copyright term is the life of
the author plus 70 years, but anything published
before 1923 is now in the public domain. Finally,
a work may be in the public domain for failure
to meet a technical requirement of copyright.
For instance, for a period of time (1923-1977),
copyright notice was required when the work
was published and, without notice, the work
See Copyrights, page 20
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would fall into the public domain. In my experi-
ence, however, it is very difficult to determine
whether the work was originally published with-
out notice.
The copyright statutes are filled with other
situation-specific exceptions to the owner’s
exclusive rights. For example, 17 U.S.C. 110(1)
provides that in the course of face-to-face teach-
ing activities at non-profit schools, teachers may
perform or display copyrighted works. Other sec-
tions allow certain library copying of copyright-
ed materials. 
Finally, the mother of all exceptions is the
“fair use doctrine.” The statute states simply
enough that “the fair use of a copyrighted work .
. . for purposes such as criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching, . . . scholarship, or research
is not an infringement of copyright.”1 Un-
fortunately, the statute continues to define “fair
use” in a less than clear manner. Essentially, for
a use to be fair, it must pass a four-part balancing
test. Each factor is theoretically given equal
weight. The factors include:
• The purpose and character of the use:
Elements considered here include: Is
the use transformative or for a use
other than originally intend-
ed? Is the use commercial
in nature?
• The nature of the
work: Important fac-
tors here include: Is
the work unpub-
lished? How much
creativity was in-
volved in the work?
• The amount and
substantiality of the
work used: Questions I
ask with regard to this
factor are: Do you want to
use the whole work? Even if
you’re just using a small por-
tion, are you giving away the
punch line?
• The effect of the use upon the potential
market for or value of the work.2
As you can see, there rarely are times when you
come away from the fair use test thinking that
you have a concrete answer. Many groups have
worked on “guidelines” or “best practices” for
fair use but most fail to grasp the expansive
nature of fair use and seem overly restrictive.
Though many of these exceptions do not
yield definitive answers, make no mistake that
the exceptions and the rights of the public to use
copyrighted works carved out in the statutes are
rights as valid as copyright ownership rights
themselves. In fact, a string of new cases have
confirmed the vitality of the fair use doctrine. In
future articles, we will take a detailed look at
some of these cases as they, perhaps better than
any guidelines, offer guidance on the parameters
of fair use.
Endnotes:
1.  17 U.S.C. 107. 
2.  Id.
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110 Public Law 22 – Animal Fighting Prohibition Enforcement Act of 2007 (H.R. 137) 
Imposes a fine and/or prison term of up to three years for violations of the Animal Welfare Act
(AWA). Prohibits sponsoring or exhibiting an animal in an animal fighting venture; buying selling,
transporting, or delivering animals for participation in animal fighting; or, using the mail or other
form of interstate commerce to promote or further animal fighting. Also amends the AWA to prohibit
knowingly selling, buying, transporting, or delivering a knife, a gaffe, or any other sharp instrument
for use in bird fighting. 
110 Public Law 47 – Grand Teton National Park Extension Act of 2007 (S. 277)
Modifies the boundaries of Grand Teton National Park to include certain land within the GT Park
Subdivision and for other purposes. 
110 Public Law 69 – America COMPETES Act (H.R. 2272)
Provides an approach for the United States to maintain and improve its technological and scientific
innovation by strengthening scientific research, improving education, and enhancing technological
expertise.
110 Public Law 94 – Pesticide Registration Improvement Renewal Act (S. 1983) 
Amends the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act to renew and amend the provisions
for the enhanced review of covered pesticide products, to authorize fees for certain pesticide prod-
ucts, and to expend and improve the collection of maintenance fees, and for other purposes.
110 Public Law 114 – Water Resources Development Act of 2007 (H.R. 1495) 
Reauthorizes the Water Resources Development Act (WRDA), which authorizes projects for naviga-
tion, ecosystem or environmental restoration, and hurricane, flood, or storm damage reduction in
Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri and Kansas, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Penn-
sylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia, and Washington. Terminates specified projects in Florida.
110 Public Law 115 – Recognition of Navy UDT-SEALS Museum (H.R. 2779) 
Recognizes the Navy UDT-SEAL Museum in Fort Pierce, Florida, as the official national museum
of Navy SEALs and their predecessors. 
110 Public Law 132 – African Elephant Conservation Act (H.R. 50)
Amends the African Elephant Conservation Act and the Rhinoceros and Tiger Conservation Act of
1994. The Act authorizes appropriations for fiscal years 2007-2012, increases administrative expense
allowances, and abolishes provisions requiring the Secretary of the Interior to notify countries of
approval of conservation projects for African elephants, rhinoceros, and tigers. 
110 Public Law 133 – Asian Elephant Conservation Act (H.R. 465)
Amends the Asian Elephant Conservation Act and the Rhinoceros and Tiger Conservation Act of
1994. The Act authorizes appropriations for fiscal years 2007-2012, increases administrative expense
allowances, and abolishes provisions requiring the Secretary of the Interior to notify countries of
approval of conservation projects for Asian elephants.
Federal Legislation, 2007
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Australia Anti-Fouling Convention Enacted
On September 17, 2008, the International Convention on the Control of Harmful Anti-Fouling
Systems on Ships, 2001 will enter into force. The convention requires internationally-traveling ships
400 gross tons and above to have an International Anti-Fouling System Certificate. Ships must pass
an inspection to receive the certificate. Ships less than 400 gross tons but 24-meters or longer must
carry a Declaration of Anti-Fouling Systems signed by the shipowner or authorized agent. 
Red and Pink Coral Export to Be Regulated
In June, a committee at a United Nations Wildlife Conference voted to begin regulating the export
of red and pink corals. The corals are threatened by over-harvesting, pollution, seabed trawling, and
global warming. The restrictions on international trade should be in effect by the end of 2008. 
Australia Signs Kyoto Protocol
In December, Australia signed the Kyoto Protocol. Australia’s new Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd,
signed the agreement just nine days after his election. Australia’s action leaves the United States as
one of the few industrialized nations that has not signed the Protocol. 
China and South Korea Agree to Green Desert
Beijing and Seoul have signed an agreement to “green” the Ulan Buh Desert in China. The countries
will spend about $2 million U.S. dollars to grow trees and build greenhouses in the regions. Officials
hope the project will help stop environmental deterioration in the area. 
Endangered Turtle Eggs Recovered in Mexico
In October, thousands of endangered turtle
eggs were recovered from smugglers in
Oaxaca, Mexico, during a routine road-block
set up by police. The olive ridley turtles are
listed as an endangered species in the United
States, but the eggs are part of a traditional
diet in the Mexican region of Oaxaca.
International 
Law Update
Correction: A photograph in The SandBar 6:3 p.14 was incorrectly identified as the USS Missouri
Memorial in Pearl Harbor. The photograph was a picture of the USS Arizona Memorial. 
Photograph of olive ridley turtles in Mexico courtesy of NOAA, photographer
Michael P. Jensen
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State and federal officials have plans to eradicate the rats from Rat Island in Alaska. Introduced to
the island in 1780 by a rat-infested ship, the rats feed on seabirds and their eggs and chicks and have
annihilated the bird populations of the island. The
state enacted regulations requiring ships to check for
rats and eradicate them. The state is issuing brochures
to mariners that will explain how to control rats on
ships and prevent them from going ashore. Addi-
tionally, biologists will drop rat poison from heli-
copters onto the island.
Ireland’s only salmon farm has been devastated by
jelly fish. A huge pack of jelly fish – estimated to be 10
square miles and 35 feet deep – descended on the farm
killing 100,000 salmon. Workers tried to save the fish,
but their
boats were unable to reach the pens in time. The jelly
fish, Pelagia nocticula, usually do not travel so far north.
The company hopes to receive emergency aid from the
government. 
A Charleston man was rescued for the second time in
three years when his boat was carried into a river by the
tide. When he didn’t return home from a fishing trip, his
wife called authorities. He spent the night shivering in
his boat, while the Coast Guard and local authorities
launched a search. After the rescue, he was treated for
dehydration and exposure at a local hospital. In 2004, he
was rescued after his boat was grounded and he became
trapped in knee-deep mud trying to push the boat out. His wife now requires him to have a friend or
a cell phone with him on his boating expeditions. 
In Kansas, a woman was frying fish on the stove when she briefly stepped out of the house to take out
the trash. The family’s dog shut the door behind her. A grease fire erupted and fully engulfed the
house. The dog made it out safely, but the fire caused over $50,000 in damages. 
In England, a canoeist disappeared and was presumed drowned in 2002. Recently, the man showed
up in a local police station, claiming that he had suffered amnesia. After some questioning, the police
found that the story was false. He had been hiding, with the help of his wife, at his residence since
his disappearance. The man and his wife have been charged with fraud. Police believe their two sons,
who did not live with the couple, had no knowledge of the hoax.
Photograph of jellyfish courtesy of NOAA NMFS AFSC, pho-
tographers Matt Wilson/Jay Clark.
Photograph of rat courtesy of National Institute of Health.
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